

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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1. Military developments in the field of television have been treated with the utmost secrecy. Both NII-380 and NII-160 worked on the development of military television, and very strict security controls ensured that no German specialists ever came in contact with these programs.

2. At Institute 380 the director of the entire operation

was a Colonel SELEZNEV.

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He had the over-all responsibility for all projects, and he received orders for further development work from the higher organizational levels

The chief of the

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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military development department was ZAKHAROV. He is the same Soviet engineer who became the director of Fernseh GmbH in Tannwald after the war. He also claimed to be the inventor of a television-telephone system which enabled the parties to see, as well as to talk to, each other.

3. While it is true that the military department did not have the best engineers in NII 380, ZAKHAROV had the power to commandeer the services of any engineer he wanted for any special project. For example, he placed special engineers in the laboratory developing the "Kippgeraete", and thereby trained enough people to be able to assure the continued development of this apparatus after the Germans left. (In connection with the statement just made,

that the "Kippgeraete" is a saw-tooth generator, and deny the idea that development of saw-tooth generators as a class gives any indication of military application.)

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4. Both the engineers that were working for the military department in other sections of the building, and those that were physically located inside the military department's area, were forbidden by ZAKHAROV to consult with the Germans on questions related to the "Tonne" and "Seedorf" equipment. None the less, contacts were established, and through them it became clear that the Soviets were trying to replace the German components in these equipments with Soviet components. there was no other development done on either system.

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5. This tendency, for the Soviets to concentrate on the "sovietizing" of old systems, is a reflection of the primary Soviet development schedule, in my opinion. The first effort that the Soviets make is to develop a basic, "sovietized" system. If a prior basic system (for example, a wartime German system) is on hand, this first stage consists of nothing more than getting the apparatus to work with Soviet components. The second stage is, then, to proceed from this system to new and advanced systems. The examples are these: First, when the German group first went to the USSR, they were given the order to develop a basic set of television studio equipment according to their own ideas. After this primary target was met, the order was received to start the construction of a completely modern studio and transmitter system which must be in line with Soviet standards. Second, the first type of television receiver that was developed was a single instrument known as the "Type A-1". After this television set was operating, the ministry gave the order for the development of a whole series of models. (one of the aims of this project was also to train new personnel in television techniques.)

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6. there were two schools of thought on what developments would take place at NII 380. One group was of the opinion that the "Lesnoy" branch would be enlarged and would eventually be entirely devoted to military

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projects. The other and smaller group held just the reverse of this opinion, that the "Fontanka" branch would contain the military section. [] there is a preponderance of evidence to support the majority opinion. It appeared to us that, in any event, the military branch would occupy one of the branch buildings entirely in no more than three months after our departure. 25X1

7. There was, in Germany near the end of the war, a television homing device called the "Sprotte" system. [] the purpose of the equipment was to use ground-to-air-missiles against flying formations. The "Sprotte" system worked on principles entirely different from a normal television system, and there was some talk at NII 380 that the Soviets had obtained the system, but could not understand the function of the device and had discarded it. [] 25X1
- ZAKHAROV had referred to this system as "a German toy, of no practical value". Although there was apparently no development work being done on this equipment in the USSR, the Soviets apparently had kept all of the plans for the equipment. 25X1

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